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--Interview with Lieutenant General (Re.) Jay M. Garner, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (May 18, 1998) 访美国陆军前副参谋长助理杰伊·加纳中将(退役)

MR. CHEN BOJIANG: What is the contribution of the Army to future joint operations1? What new changes will arise in the relationship between the Army and other services in future joint operations?

MR GARNER: What changes? Well, I think, the biggest change is in how far you can shoot and how much information you have. What’s happened today is all the services on the battlefield, get the same information about the same time. No one gets any more information. The Air Force and the Navy don’t get any more information or any better information than the Army. The Army doesn’t get any more information or any better information than the Air Force and the Navy. So, we all have the same information. That means you can all develop the same targets. There was a time before when only the deep targets were seen by the Air Force and only the surface Naval targets were seen by the Navy. Everybody sees the same target list at the same time now, so, the Army, more and more, every year, can shoot deeper and deeper. I mean, this year, we’ll hundred kilometers. In future years, it will be over four hundred kilometers. So, what it means is the area of controlled by the Army commander is expanding greatly. what is means to the Air Force now is that the Air Force now doesn’t have to spend as many sorties working the close air support. They can go deeper and do more strategic work. We spent a lot of sorties in the past with the Air Force working the ground from say fifteen kilometers to a hundred kilometers deep. They don’t need to do that. They don’t have to do that. We can do that for ourselves. I mean, we see the battlefield. Our missiles are more accurate than airplanes. So, what we need to do now is expand the area of operations of the land components-The surface commanders, both the Nacy and the Army surface commanders. Then free up2 those aircraft that used to work close air support to go deeper and do much more work, strategic work, than they did before. I think that’s the biggest difference.

MR. CHEN: What is your opinion on information superiority in the future joint operation? MR. GARNER: Well, I think that there’s big difference right now between U.S. forces and other forces in terms of information superiority. But, that window is going to close. Fifteen or twenty years from now, our enemies will have as much information as we have. So, the skill in the future will not be how you use information against your enemy. It’s how you can take his information away from him.

MR. CHEN: In future Joint Operations, how will former operational arts3 such as Centers of Gravity4 and Decisive Points, Simultaneity and Depth, Timing and Tempo, and so forth, change?

MR. GARNER: You always have a center of gravity if you’re an enemy. You have one yourself and your enemy has one. So, identifying the center of gravity will still be important. The difference is how quickly you get to that center of gravity now. How fast can you do that? Hopefully, as you go into Army After Next, as you go into the Revolution in Military Affairs, you will be able to reach the enemy center of gravity much, much faster than you were able to in the past. As long as he doesn’t have an asymmetric5 way to keep you from that.

MR. CHEN: Logistics is a growing concern for large army deployments. How does the U.S. Army address this challenge?

Mr. GARNER: Well, logistics has been a problem for five thousand years. It will always be a problem. The only way to begin to try to overcome the logistics problem is in your platforms. If you begin to be able to predict when things will wear out, so that you can have some sort of predictive analysis for support. In other words, I know that, in my tank, my engine is going to wear out probably next week sometime. The logisticians, they begin moving the new engine for me. You have digital electronics in there so when something happens to the vehicle, the logistician automatically knows. I don’t have to call him and tell him. He automatically knows that. And, he begins to immediately react to that. You have more fuel efficient vehicles, so that you have to move less fuel around the battlefield. But,

you’ll always have the problems with things like water and food. Takes a lot of water for an Army and it takes a lot of food for an Army. What we’re talking about now is just in time logistics, which means we don’t move a lot of logistics. We predict what we’ll need and only move what we think we’re going to need. The ability to track where all the items you need are through stages, by putting a chip on whatever it is you’re moving. You’ll always know where it is in the pipeline. But, that’s a long ways off. We talk about it now, we’re getting better at it, but logistics will remain a problem in the future. It will always be a problem.

MR. CHEN: What changes do you predict will arise in the roles and mission of the Army in the post-Cold War? What efforts do the Army need to enact in order to meet these changes?

MR. GARNER: I don’t think you’ll see any changes in roles and missions. You know, the mission of the Army is to fight sustained6 land combat. That isn’t going to change. That will stay its mission. There’s a number of different roles that they’ll have to take on, in order to do that. But I think you’ll find, over the next ten or fifteen years, that most of the emphasis will be at the lower a spectrum of the spectrum of war. You know, peacekeeping operations7, more humanitarian8 operations, that type of thing. There will be some things in the middle of the scale. But, I don’t think many. I think the danger is not looking, not focusing on the upper end of the scale, because you’re doing of many things down at the bottom of the scale. Because you never know when, one day, you’ll have to fight another big war. And, you can never lose focus of that. But, it’s easy during this period to lose focus of that and only focus on the things like Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia that type thing.

MR. CHEN: Could you give me a brief introduction to the structure of research agencies and organizations in the Army? What is the relationship between them?

MR. GARNER: The research agencies? Oh, there’s a lot of them. In each one of our posts, that is a development post9, we have a research and development center there. For example, take Huntsville. Huntsville is a center of excellence for missiles, for the development of missiles. We have a huge research and development center there. So, if you go into each one of the posts where we build things, make things, or manage things, have the programs for them, we have a big research and development center. Now, outside of that, that’s sort of and acquisition function. As far as the think tank type piece goes, we have the missile analysis center out at White Sands. We have combat analysis agency here in Washington, D.C. We have a lot of deep attack analysis that goes on at West Point. We have a good analytical base at West Point. A lot of analysis, war fighting analysis, and future visionary thinking and all goes on at War College in Carlisle. So, there’s an awful10 lot of research going on. The skill is bringing all that together, which is more difficult. It’s easy to think of things, much harder to bring them together.

WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 词汇提示 1.joint operations 联合作战 2.free up 腾出

3.former operational arts 以往的战役概念 4.Centers of Gravity 作战重心

5.asymmetric [] a. 不对称的 6.sustained [] a.持久的

7.peacekeeping operations 维持和平行动

8.humanitarian [] n.人道主义 9.post [] n.基地

10.awful [] a.大量的

QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 听后答题: 1. What has happened today on the battle field?

A.It is all the services on the battlefield get the same information about the same time.

B.It is all the services get the same order about the same time. C.It is all the services attack the same target about the same time.

D.It is all the services communicate same massages about the same time.

2. When does Mr. Garner think the enemies would have as much information as the U.S. has?

A.10 or 15 years from now. B.15 or 20 years from now. C.5 or 10 years from now. D.10 or 20 years from now.

3. What will be the skill about information in the future?

A.It is how to use the information.

B.It is how you can take his information away from him. C.It is how to get the information.

D.It is how to analyze the information. 4. How long has logistics been a problem? A.For two thousand years. B.For four thousand years. C.For five thousand years. D.For six thousand years.

5. What is the only way to begin to try to overcome the logistics problem? A.It is in the platforms. B.It is in the personnel. C.It is in the organization. D.It is in the communication.

6. What’s the meaning of in time logistics?

A.It means that you need to move logistics more quickly.

B.It means that you don’t move a lot of logistics and only move what you’re going to need. C.It means that you can move a lot of logistics more easily. D.It means that you can move a lot of logistics more effectively. 7. What is the mission of the Army? A.It is to safeguard the mainland. B.It is to fight sustained land combat. C.It is to guard against terrorists. D.It is to suppress the rebellion.

8. What type of thing is at the lower spectrum of the spectrum of war? A.Such as a hi- tech regional war. B.Such as suppressing rebellions. C.Such as border conflicts.

D.Such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations. 9. What is Huntsville for?

A.A center for development of torpedo. B.A center for development of ammunition. C.A center for development of airplane. D.A center for development of missiles. 10. What is there at West Point? A.There is an analytical base. B.There is a missile base.

C.There is a combat analysis agency. D.There is a war fighting analysis.

【参考译文】

联合作践中的美国陆军

陈伯江：陆军对未来联合作战的贡献是什么？在未来联合作战中，陆军与其他军种之间的关系会有哪些新的变化？

加纳：我认为最大的变化是你在多远可以发射和你能获得多少信息。目前的情况是战场上所有的军种几乎在同时获得同样的信息。没有一个军种可以多得到一点信息。空军和海军不能得到任何比陆军更多或更好的信息。因此，我们都拥有同样的信息。这意味着各军种都可能发现相同的目标。陆军也不能得到任何比空军和海军更多或更好的信息。因此我们都拥有同样的信息。这意味着各军种都可能发现相同的目标。以往只有空军才能看到位于纵深目标，只有海军才能看到水上目标。现在各军种都能同时看到相同的目标清单。因此陆军攻击纵深目标的距离一年比一年远。我的意思是，今年我们的陆军战术导弹系统的发射距离已超过300公里，今后几年将可超过400公里。这表明陆军指挥官控制的范围已大大地扩展了。对空军来说，这意味现在不必耗费许多架次用于近距离空中支援，空军可到更深的纵深去执行更具战略性的任务。过去我们花费大量的空军架次用于15公里至100公里纵深的地面作战。现在不需要他们去做这些事，我们自己可以做了。我的意思是，我们能看到战场，我们的导弹比飞机更准确。因此，目前我们要做的是扩大地面军种和地面指挥官（包括海军和陆军地面指挥官）的作战区域，然后腾出以往用于近距离空中支援的飞机到更远的纵深去执行比过去更多的战略任务。我认为这是最大的不同。

陈：您对未来联合作战中的信息优势有何看法？

加纳：我认为就信息优势来说，目前其它国家军队与美国军队之间存在着较大的差距。但这种差距正趋于缩小。在从现在起15或者20年内，我们的敌人将会拥有与我们同样多的信息。因此，未来的关键问题将不是你怎样对你的敌人使用信息，而是你怎样才能从你的敌人那里剥夺信息。

陈：在未来的联合作战中，以往的战役概念如“作战重心”、“决定点”、“同时”、“纵深”、“时机和节奏”等等，将会有哪些变化？

加纳：如果你是一个敌人，你总会有一个重心。你有一个你的重心，而你的敌人有一个他的重心。因此，确定“作战重心”将仍然是重要的。不同的是你现在多快才能到达那个“重心”，多快才能摧毁那个重心？当发展到“后天的陆军”、发展到军事革命阶段时，可能有希望用比以往快得多的速度到达敌人的重心，只要他不采用非对称的方法使你无法接近他。

陈：后勤保障对于大规模陆军行动日显重量要，美国陆军如何对付这一挑战？

加纳：5000年来，后勤一直是一个问题，今后仍将是一个问题。解决后勤问题的唯一办法是从作战平台做起。如果你能够预计什么时候物资将消耗殆尽，你就可提出对后勤保障的某种预测分析。换句话说，我知道我的坦克发动机大约会在下个星期的某个时候报废，后勤人员就可以为我运来一台新发动机。在你的坦克上有一个数字式的电子装置，当有什么情况发生时，后勤人员可自动地知道，我不必打电话告诉他，他能自动了解情况，并立即开始对情况做出反应。你拥有能更加高效使用燃料的坦克，因此你向战场调运的油料更少。但是，你会经常遇到水和食品这类问题，军队要消耗大量的水和食品。我们现在所说的是实时后勤保障问题，其含意是我们不要运输大量的后勤物资，我们预计所需要的物资，并只运送我们将会需要的物资。跟踪你所需要的各项物资的能力是通过在你机动的各个站点放上一个电脑芯片获得的。你总能知道你所需要的物资在运输系统的什么位置。然而，这是一个长期的发展过程，我们现在谈论它，我们将不断完善它，但后勤保障在今后仍将是一个有待解决的问题．

陈：在冷战后，陆军的职能和任务不会有什么变化，你知道，陆军的任务是进行持续的地面作战，这将不会变，仍然是陆军的任务。为完成这个任务，陆军必须增加一些新的职能。但是，我想你会发现，在今后10至15年间，陆军的大多数任务将集中在战争频谱的较低谱段，即维和、人道主义行动这类任务。在战争频谱的中段也会有一些事情，但不会太多．我认为危险在于由于较低谱段将有许多事情要做，因而看不到、忽视战争频谱的高段。但是不知道什么时候、哪一天将要打另一场大仗。陆军绝不能忘记还有可能打大仗这个重点。然而，在这期间很容易忘记这个重点，而只把重点放在像波斯尼亚、卢旺达、海地、索马里这类事情上。

陈：请您简要介绍一下陆军的研究机构和组织的构成。这些机构和组织之间的关系如何？

加纳：你问研究机构？对，有许多这样的机构。在我们的每一个开发基地，都有一个研究开发中心。例如，拿亨茨维尔来说，它就是一个用于导弹开发的先进研究中心，在那里有一个大型的研究与发展中心。因此，如果你到每一个开发基地（在这些基地我们建立、制造、管理某些东西，进行一些研究项目）。则都有一个大的研究和开发中心，这些中心还有某种采购功能。就思想库类的研究机构来说，在白沙试验场，我们有导弹分析中心；在华盛顿我们有作战分析机构；在西点军校我们进行了大量的纵深攻击分析，我们在那有一个非常好的分析基地。大量有关作战分析、未来构想的研究都是在克莱尔兵营的陆军军事学院进行的。因此，大量的研究项目正在进行。问题是如何把所有这些研究结合起来，这是最困难的。思考一些问题并不难，而使它们结合起来却要难得多。

KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 参考答案： 1.a 2.b 3.b 4.c 5.a 6.b 7.b 8.d 9.d 10.a